Key takeaways:
- Diplomatic and media tensions have escalated between Egypt and Ethiopia following Addis Abeba’s announcement of the completion of work on the Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s commencement of its joint defense agreement with Somalia.
- The emerging conflict between Egypt and Somalia on one side, and Ethiopia on the other, has deep strategic roots, revolving around Somalia’s position in the regional framework and Ethiopia’s ambitions to secure its vital regional interests and endeavor to turn into a naval, military and trade power.
- While ruling out the possibilities of comprehensive reconciliation and military confrontation, prolonged tension seems to be the most likely scenario for the crisis between Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Somalia and Egypt, on the other. This scenario may involve sporadic armed clashes as well as continued media and diplomatic escalation.
The Horn of Africa has recently witnessed rapid developments following Ethiopia’s announcement of the completion of the construction of the Renaissance Dam. Meanwhile, Egypt has deployed military equipment and sent delegations to Somalia as part of the joint defense pact between the two countries. This has sparked a media war between Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia, signaling potentially dangerous developments in the region, which– according to some analysis – could escalate into direct military conflict.
Regional Developments
On August 27, 2024, Ethiopia announced the completion of the construction of the Renaissance Dam and its transition to the operational phase, with the reservoir expected to be completely filled this September. Addis Abeba launched this grand project in 2011 at a cost of $4 billion, announcing that the dam would have a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters of water. Egypt has objected to this project from the start, arguing that it threatens its water security, as the country relies on the Nile for 97% of its water supply. Cairo has repeatedly called on Addis Abeba to suspend work on the dam until an agreement is reached between Ethiopia and both Egypt and Sudan regarding sharing the Nile water.
The Ethiopian announcement coincided with the arrival of Egyptian military equipment and delegations in Somalia, under the joint defense agreement signed between Cairo and Mogadishu on August 14, 2024. Key provisions of the agreement include enhancing the military and training capabilities of the Somali army, supporting Mogadishu in its fight against terrorism and separatist groups and establishing an Egyptian military presence as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is supposed to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by January 2025.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty sent a formal letter to the President of the UN Security Council, expressing his country’s complaint against Ethiopia upon the latter’s announcement that it has completed the fifth stage of filling the Renaissance Dam. Abdelatty characterized this move as a violation of the declaration of principles signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia in 2015. On August 28, 2024, the Ethiopian foreign ministry issued a statement protesting Egyptian military assistance to Somalia, calling it a risky intervention in regional affairs and a direct threat to Ethiopia’s strategic interests.
On August 30, 2024, Ethiopia sent an ambassador to Somaliland (unrecognized internationally). This step marks an open recognition of Somaliland’s independence, following a long-standing relationship between the two sides. One key development in this relationship was the January 1, 2024 agreement to lease a 20-kilometer coastal area to Ethiopia. Mogadishu protested against this deal, describing it as illegitimate, and expelled the Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia. Tension escalated to the brink of war between the two countries.
The Strategic Dimensions of the New Crisis in the Horn of Africa
A distinction should be made between the strategies of the three countries – Ethiopia, Somalia and Egypt – directly involved in the current crisis.
For Ethiopia, this pivotal Horn of Africa country considers its vital interests to be tied to securing permanent access to the Red Sea, a goal that has persisted after losing its only seaport, Asmara, following Eritrea’s secession in 1993. While Ethiopia currently uses the Port of Djibouti, its extensive needs cannot be fully met by this sole outlet. As a result, Addis Ababa has supported Somaliland’s secession from Somalia – which unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 – viewing Somaliland as it backyard base in the Red Sea and a critical regional gateway. Therefore, Ethiopia perceives any Egyptian-Somali rapprochement as a threat to its strategy to expand influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly given the internal conflicts within Ethiopia, a large federal state that sees its border with Somalia as a key security risk. According to Ethiopian strategic circles, Addis Ababa believes that the Egyptian-Somali defense pact threatens its strategic interests in Somalia, poses great risks to its sovereignty over its water resources and inflames tension and turmoil in the whole region.
As for Somalia – which continues to grapple with a prolonged civil war and battles against terrorist organizations – the strategic objective is to regain its pivotal role in the Red Sea region. To achieve this, Mogadishu seeks to reintegrate Somaliland and resolve its maritime dispute with Kenya. In this context, Somalia views Ethiopia as the greatest risk to its unity and geopolitical interests. To counter this, Mogadishu has sought to establish regional and international alliances to break the strategic blockade imposed on it. In this context, Somalia signed with Turkiye in 2012 a defense agreement (military training and cooperation) that was upgraded to a defense and economic cooperation agreement on August 2, 2024. This agreement allows Turkiye to build its largest overseas base to protect Somali territorial waters for 10 years, in addition to commencing oil and gas exploration in three Somali maritime locations. However, Somalia’s defense pact with Egypt is seen by local strategic circles as a way to elevate its regional standing, shifting from a marginal country into an key regional player –posing a direct challenge to Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambitions.
Egypt, on the other hand, remains in a tense standoff with Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam and seeks to leverage Somalia to manage this conflict. Cairo aims to secure concessions from Addis Ababa on the dam while enhancing its influence in the Red Sea, a region critical to Egypt’s national security. In recent months, Egypt has strengthened ties with other countries in the Horn of Africa, such as Eritrea and Djibouti, signaling its ambition for regional leadership and its desire to counter Ethiopia’s expanding influence. Cairo is also exploiting Ethiopia’s disputes with its neighbors to further its strategic objectives.
Prospects of the Regional Conflict in the Horn of Africa
Three likely scenarios can be envisioned for the ongoing regional conflict in the Horn of Africa:
1.Military Confrontation Scenario: The region could descend into military conflict if war breaks out between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Renaissance Dam. A separate military confrontation could also erupt between Ethiopia and Somalia following Addis Ababa’s quasi-recognition of Somaliland’s independence. While this scenario is not the most likely at the moment, it cannot be completely ruled out given the growing regional tensions.
2.De-escalation and Reconciliation Scenario: Several countries are advocating for this outcome, including Turkiye, which hosted direct talks between Ethiopia and Somalia on August 13, 2024. Djibouti has also intervened in the reconciliation efforts and made a proposal for Addis Ababa to manage and operate its port in Tadjoura, located just 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian border. China is also believed to have joined the de-escalation and mediation efforts. However, this scenario appears to have limited chances of success in the near future, given the significant gap in the strategic interests and concerns of the parties to the conflict.
3.Growing Tension Scenario: This seems to be the most likely scenario at the moment. Although it is unlikely to escalate into a full-scale military confrontation, the possibility of limited skirmishes, alongside diplomatic and media escalation, cannot be dismissed.
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Editor’s Note: This op-ed was first published by the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an independent think tank based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. It is republished on Addis Standard website under the auspices of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between JAKENN Publishing PLC, the Publisher of Addis Standard tri-lingual publications, and EPC, providing mutual principles for content sharing.
