This article is part of the Analytical Reporting to Improve the Federation (ARIF) project.
The government’s denial of constitutionally protected autonomy rights is creating chaos in Ethiopia’s largest region.
On the morning of 2 November 2022, the sound of weeping and grieving could be heard as local residents gathered around a small house in Burayu, an Oromia town located on the western outskirts of Ethiopia’s capital.
News of his brother’s killing had just reached Temesgen, the owner of the house who is employed in one of the federal institutions in Addis Ababa. When asked why they were weeping, one responded, “those in the government killed Mr. Temesgen’s brother!”
The brother’s name was Dereje Yadeta and he was killed on 30 October by government security forces in Shambu town, Horo Guduru Wollega Zone’s capital, where he had been living with his sister.
Dereje was a Grade 12 student awaiting the announcement of the date of a national exam, given to students in other areas in October, that was postponed in their area due to continued attacks on civilians by Amhara militants and the war between Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and government forces.
The deceased was a preacher at one of the Protestant churches in Horo Guduru Wollega, an administrative zone in Oromia that has been a hotspot for recurring ethnic-based massacres of Oromo and Amhara civilians.
According to Temesgen, Dereje was shot dead in broad daylight on a street filled with people. He claims his brother had no involvement in politics. He was too busy with his studies and church service.
A week after his murder, a youth claiming to be an eyewitness said that a group of Oromia Special Forces standing on the side of the road in Shambu town stopped and started questioning Dereje, who was on his way back home from church.
“Within a few minutes, the government forces started firing their guns at him,” he told Ethiopia Insight.
A month prior to Dereje’s murder, Amhara militants raided his family’s village in Wolkite Kebele of Amuru Wereda. “Fano killed 16 people including three elderly people and burnt many houses in our parent’s village,” Temesgen said.
In Oromia, killings of civilians by both state and non-state actors have become the new normal. Extrajudicial executions by security forces and ethnic-based killings by armed groups have resulted in the death of thousands of civilians over the last four years.
Multiple armed groups operate in Oromia, and all are accused of such killings. The OLA, government forces, an alleged regime-allied OLA clone, Amhara Fano and local militias, and other unidentified armed groups have an active presence in Oromia, especially in Wollega.
As part of the continually evolving situation, the federal government and Fano, former allies in the wars against the TPLF and OLA, have been battling since last August as part of the protracted fallout from the November 2022 peace deal that ended the Tigray war.
While the Oromo opposition is somewhat divided on whether to support the armed insurgency and what exactly self-determination should entail, they agree the crisis in Oromia is driven by successive Ethiopian regimes violently suppressing Oromo autonomy.
After the “fake” federalism of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) era, when a ruling coalition controlled by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) made all the decisions from the center, Oromo nationalists believe self-rule has deteriorated further under Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party, the EPRDF’s successor.
To add to the woes, after the EPRDF system began to disintegrate in 2018, the clash between Amhara nationalists, who view imperial Ethiopia as a relatively benign, modernizing construct, and Oromo nationalists, who want to deconstruct that empire-state, has heated up, complicating the Oromia conflict, and exacerbating civilian suffering.
History Repeating
From 2014 to 2018, many Oromos, particularly among the youth, protested against the authoritarianism of the EPRDF, and the dominance of the TPLF within it.
As throughout its almost three-decade rule, the EPRDF’s response included a brutal crackdown on protesters that led to hundreds of deaths, the arrest of tens of thousands of civilians in Oromia, and the declaration of a State of Emergency in October 2016, which facilitated an even more authoritarian approach by suspending elements of due process.
Team Lemma, a faction within the EPRDF’s Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), of which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was a member, began listening to Oromo protesters and talking on behalf of them. The team was later joined by a group in the EPRDF’s Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM).
By speaking the language of the protesters in the streets, Team Lemma and the ANDM presented themselves as revolutionaries from within the EPRDF. In late 2017, under heavy pressure, the EPRDF pledged to reform itself and respect the rights of the people.
In the first quarter of 2018, the EPRDF Executive Committee announced the decision to release political prisoners and open up the political landscape, and handed the position of EPRDF chairman to Abiy, a rising star in the OPDO. He was then inaugurated as Prime Minister in April 2018.
For some time, Abiy followed the reforms agreed on by the Executive Committee, such as releasing political prisoners. He also made peace with Eritrea, a long-time adversary of the TPLF and Ethiopia, and allowed the return of several armed rebel groups classified as terrorists by the federal government.
But, in order to consolidate his power, Abiy’s government employed a strategy used by the EPRDF to suppress any meaningful opposition in Oromia: arresting suspected supporters and members of the two most popular Oromo nationalist parties, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC).
As Abiy distanced himself from the demands of the Oromo protesters, he aligned himself with Amhara elites, praising Ethiopian emperors who subjugated and oppressed Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities.
Additionally—in what Oromo and other ethno-nationalists view as an attempt to centralize power but supporters cast as an attempt to narrow the splits between Ethiopia’s communities—he merged almost all of the EPRDF parties and their allies into the Prosperity Party in 2019, despite opposition from within his party, the rebranded Oromo Democracy Party (ODP). The TPLF was the only one to reject the consolidation outright.
The merger was considered by a swath of Oromos, especially activists and intellectuals, as Abiy’s attempt to establish a unitary system. Even Lemma Megersa, the de facto leader of Team Lemma, resisted it, leading to Abiy sidelining him.
For these former allies, Abiy’s formation of the Prosperity Party enabled the reappearance of Amhara-centric Ethiopian nationalism, with its security structures engaged in surveilling, arbitrarily arresting, beating, and killing civilians, especially youth in Oromia.
Building on an acute sense of marginalization that has grown as a political force since the 1960s, these are the contemporary dynamics that mushroomed into today’s conflict raging across much of the region.
Triumphant Return
The failure of the transition is best viewed through the failure to successfully reintegrate the OLF, the standard bearer of Oromo nationalism, into competitive politics.
Rather than allow the OLF and the OFC to compete fairly in elections, Abiy’s government shut them out of power after nominally inviting them back to compete. An armed wing of the OLF, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), then went its own way and pursued military resistance.
Despite initial hopes that the EPRDF’s implosion would trigger electoral pluralism and competitive, peaceful federal politics, the country has collapsed along with its iron-fisted ruling coalition into an orgy of violence, much of it between political factions, the TPLF and the Prosperity Party and the OLA and the ruling party, as well as between groups from the country’s two most populous communities, the Oromo and the Amhara.
Until these violent political disputes are over, the focus of most Oromo nationalists remains securing the self-rule they believe the community is still denied.
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The September 2018 return of the OLF leadership from exile should have marked a new more positive chapter in Ethiopian politics. Many Oromos were overjoyed, while opponents of Oromo nationalism, including the incumbent party and Ethiopian nationalists, expressed concern at the OLF’s return and the party’s support.
Yet, presumably due to the electoral threat it represented, the OLF wasn’t allowed to participate freely in the country’s politics. The government proceeded to launch a campaign of accusations against the OLF, and ‘welcomed’ the OLF leadership with a wave of repression against its members and supporters.
The government scaled up its crackdown in January 2019 by arresting several top OLF officials, including Gemechu Ayana and Jabessa Gabbissa. In March 2022, OLF spokesperson Bate Urgessa, OLF chairman Dawud Ibsa, and Gemechu Ayana, another senior OLF official, were freed.
However, now years later, most top OLF officials remain in Ethiopian prison or face constant harassment by the legal system. Families of opposition groups have also been targets of state repression. Notably, several of Dawud’s close relatives were killed or abducted.
Divided Front
The OLA was the OLF’s armed wing until it formally split from the OLF in April 2019.
Government forces began battling OLA insurgents in 2018 after conflict broke out around the border between Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia, which was triggered by the killing of Benishangul-Gumuz officials by unidentified assailants.
After months of clashes between government forces and the OLA, Oromo traditional leaders, known as the Abbaa Gadaa, pressured the government and OLF to solve the crisis peacefully, and integrate OLA fighters into Oromia’s security apparatus.
As part of the agreement, OLF handed the command of the OLA over to the Abbaa Gadaa and agreed to cooperate. A committee formed to oversee the integration process dispatched its members to the areas where OLA operates and welcomed some OLA members that had decided to reintegrate.
However, the agreement failed owing to the government’s unwillingness to abide by it and the OLA’s distrust in the committee that was overseeing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.
The government continued to confront OLA forces while cracking down on OLF leadership, members, and supporters. OLA leaders responded by splitting from the OLF and announced the formation of their own command structure to continue the armed struggle for Oromo self-determination.
In an interview with OLA-affiliated Oromo National Media on 30 August 2022, the OLA’s high commander, Kumsa Dirriba—who also goes by the name Jaal Marroo—stated that armed struggle is the only solution to the crisis Oromo people are facing.
Federal authorities continued deploying national defense and Federal Police forces in Oromia, and strengthening the region’s security structures. The government has also armed local Amhara militants and allowed Amhara Fano militants to cross over into Oromia as reinforcements in its fight against the OLA.
The government launched several operations against the OLA before finally designating it, along with the TPLF, as a terrorist organization in May 2021. This was used to further legitimize the government’s offensive against the OLA and intensified repression against civilians suspected of supporting its armed insurgency.
In response to increased popular support for the OLA’s resistance, since 2019 the government has intensified extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture of suspected OLA supporters and their families. Last October, as federal authorities were preparing to negotiate an end to the Tigray war, they launched a deadly campaign of drone warfare in Oromia.
Despite the intensified counterinsurgency operations by government forces, the OLA has continued growing in strength and is currently active throughout much of Oromia.
The two sides finally agreed to sit for peace talks in Zanzibar from 25 April to 3 May 2023, but little was accomplished and the OLA soon accused the government of launching another offensive.
Ethnic Attacks
In addition to the deadly war, which has escalated in recent months, ethnic-based attacks by militants have intensified in Oromia since 2021, claiming the lives of thousands of Amhara and Oromo civilians.
Militants on both sides have been accused of being responsible for a horrific slew of massacres. Incidents remain underreported due to the communications blackout, confusing narratives and the security situation on the ground.
The government has not been shy to condemn “OLF-Shene”, as it calls the OLA, and has justified or neglected ethnic-based attacks by Amhara militants against Oromo civilians, regional security forces, and local government officials.
Amhara civilians in Oromia have also been slaughtered in a string of ethnic-based attacks. Over the past two years, hundreds if not thousands of Amhara civilians were killed by militants, especially in western Oromia.
In one notable incident, Oromo militants were accused by federal authorities and Amhara activists of killing hundreds of Amhara civilians in a village called Tole in June 2022.
After each ethnic-based attack, Oromo and Amhara residents tell opposing sides of the story. The government and Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) typically accuse both the OLA and Amhara militants of being responsible, while Amhara activists accuse OLA and Oromia government forces. The OLA, for its part, denies any responsibility and accuses government-affiliated militants and Fano militants.
Narratives and counter-narratives are used to misinform or confuse Ethiopian and international audiences. Despite the claims and counterclaims, the mass killings of civilians in western Oromia have never been independently investigated.
Expansionist Ambitions
From the perspective of Oromo nationalists, the violence is mainly caused by threats and moves to annex parts of Oromia into Amhara, as has been the case in Benishangul-Gumuz and Tigray as well.
Over the past 30 years, census reports show that Oromia has progressively shrunk in size mostly owing to informal annexations by other regions. On 6 January 2020, the Oromia Land Administration Bureau said that illegal settlement in Horo Guduru Wollega, East Wollega, and West Shewa zones has intensified in recent years.
Following the split between OLA and OLF in April 2019, Amhara “Fano” militias armed themselves. Since then, attacks against Oromo civilians have intensified in parts of Oromia bounded by the Blue Nile and areas in East Shewa Zone around the A1 highway that connects Ethiopia to Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland.
Fano leaders and Amhara activists, claiming ownership of these areas that include the entire Wollega and Shewa zones, called for Amhara people to arm themselves and “reclaim their ancestral lands.”
Amhara Fano militia
Until 2021, the government had denied the presence of Fano militants, putting the blame solely on OLA contingents for the attacks on civilians. In April 2021, East Wollega Zone government reported the presence of Amhara militants in Oromia for the first time, referring to them as “Amhara extremist forces” after they attacked Oromo civilians and destroyed government offices in East Wollega Zone.
Attacks by Amhara militants have intensified in Oromia since 2021, with many Oromo civilians killed and hundreds of thousands displaced, mostly in Oromia weredas bordering Amhara.
Amhara Fano militants have since intensified their attacks, advancing into areas of eastern and western Oromia bordering Amhara, in what Oromo nationalists see as an attempt at annexation under the guise of protecting Amhara civilians in Oromia.
On 5 December, a graphic video circulated on social media of Fano militants parading the severed heads of Oromo individuals on pikes as proof of their victory in Jardega Jarte Wereda. The horrific act echoed historical accounts of nineteenth century massacres of Oromos by Emperor Menelik II.
Following these atrocities by Amhara militants, protests erupted throughout Oromia, exacerbating tensions between segments of the Oromo and Amhara people.
Communal Grievances
Oromo nationalists say that the threats and attacks against them, the hostility towards Oromo nationalism by successive regimes, and unaddressed demands since the 1960s to respect the autonomy and self-determination of the Oromo people are the root causes of the current crisis.
Though the Addis Ababa Master Plan triggered the Oromo protests in 2014, protesters’ more fundamental demands related to issues of self-rule, democracy, and the rule of law, and an end to state repression of Oromos on the basis of their ethnicity.
Oromo people demanded respect for their right to self-determination, in which they fully exercise their regional autonomy and have a fair share in the federal administration, the creation of a constitutional and democratic order, and the release of political prisoners.
They also called for the regional and federal constitutions to be respected, including the implementation of Article 49(5) of the federal constitution, which relates to the special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa.
A key demand by Oromo protesters involved the full recognition of Oromo people’s ownership of Addis Ababa, and halting the land grab scheme, eviction of farmers, and expropriation through illegal investments, trade, and construction in Oromia.
Another demand was for linguistic justice, in which Afaan Oromo is used as a federal working language, and the ‘Qubee script’, an alphabetic script adopted for the Oromo language, is respected and the sequence of its alphabets remain unaltered.
Under Abiy, none of these demands have been met.
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The government’s response has instead been extrajudicial killings, persecution of opposition officials, members, suspected supporters, and their families, and the destruction of property by government forces to pacify Oromo opposition.
The way Abiy’s government ignored Oromo demands for the implementation of rights promised by the constitution, and then violently suppressed those who opposed him, exacerbated the crisis in Oromia, and fueled support for the OLA.
Oromo activists were alarmed by the government’s alliance with Ethiopian nationalists who pledge to continue the legacies of the Ethiopian emperors by cracking down on ethnic-based nationalism. They allege that Abiy’s plan to centralize power has involved promoting the Ethiopiawinet ideology, one widely supported by Amhara nationalists and urban elites.
Anti-Oromo sentiments, insults, narratives, and threats against Oromo identity, especially by Ethiopian and Amhara nationalists, became widespread due to the government’s complicity.
As a result, ethnic tensions worsened and incidents of ethnic-based attacks targeting civilians, both Amhara and Oromo, and destruction of properties, became widespread.
Competing Visions
While the OLA, OLF, and OFC all support multinational federalism and share a common goal of securing Oromia’s autonomy, they have differences about what this means and how it should be achieved, either through armed resistance or electoral politics.
According to the OLF, its objective is to exercise the Oromos’ inalienable right to national self-determination, to terminate over a century of oppression and exploitation, and to form, where possible, a political union with other nations on the basis of equality, democracy, respect for mutual interests, and the principle of voluntary association.
The OFC’s version of self-determination is for the Oromo people to have their rights respected, to determine their own affairs, and administer their land. Its leaders aim to do so by democratizing and retaining the current structure of the Ethiopian federation.
OFC leaders believe in peaceful struggle and maintain a firm conviction that, if political power can be obtained democratically, there will be no armed conflict. According to a statement by the OFC, it has been doing its level best to defend and expand democracy and true multinational federalism in Ethiopia all along.
The OLA claims to fight for the Oromo people’s right to self-determination, with the aim to free the Oromo people from political exclusion, economic exploitation, and socio-cultural marginalization.
According to its manifesto, the OLA resorted to armed struggle because it is the sole means left to free the Oromo people from “the ravages of tyranny” and rebuild their humanity and identity that it claims have been pulverized by over a century of cultural degradation and dehumanization.
Oromo Nation
The debate over whether to try and form an independent Oromia nation-state or democratize the current Ethiopian federation has been at the heart of Oromo politics.
In recent years, given the current state of affairs, the idea of Oromia’s exit from Ethiopia’s federation has been gaining wider support among Oromo elites and political activists.
Many, especially Ethiopianists and western leaders, are vehemently opposed to secession and the current constitution. Ethiopian nationalists blame the conflicts in Ethiopia on the country’s ethno-territorial federal structure and ethnic nationalism.
However, even before the adoption of ethnic-based federalism in the early 1990s, when the country was ruled by a succession of unitary systems, nationalism among Ethiopia’s constituent nations was the driving force behind popular uprisings that brought about regime changes in Ethiopia.
Despite its perceived drawbacks and limitations, it’s too early to criticize or praise Ethiopia’s federal structure and the constitution, due to the EPRDF’s failure to properly implement its provisions.
Though the right to self-determination, especially the right to secede under Article 39, are criticized by opponents of ethnic-based federalism, both the transitional charter and the current Ethiopian constitution grant nations, nationalities, and people of Ethiopia these rights to self-determination.
The government’s continued attempts to use force to contain the situation in Oromia is likely to only lead to more bloodshed, increase support for armed opposition groups, and push the country towards disintegration.
Additionally, ethnically-targeted attacks by militants against Oromo and Amhara people could ultimately lead to a full-fledged genocidal war between Ethiopia’s two largest communities.
For Oromo nationalists, creating an enabling environment for the Oromo people to exercise their rights stipulated in the constitution is necessary to end the violence, because the crisis in Oromia is primarily caused by these denied demands.
As one Burayu resident explained, “the withdrawal of the Amhara militants, both regular and irregular forces, from Oromia, is the first step to ending the crisis in Oromia.” Thereafter, he said, the situation can only be solved by giving the Oromo people the opportunity to determine their own fate.
Another Burayu resident added, “instead of looking elsewhere for a solution to the crisis in Oromia, allowing us to exercise our constitutional rights needs to come first.”
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Main photo: Celebrating the return of the Oromo Liberation Front in Addis Ababa; September 15, 2018; Petterik Wiggers.
Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
